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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES AND PROTECTION OF
DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS: THE CASE OF NEW YORK, 1960-1978*
PETER J. GALiE**
INTRODUCTION
The Burger Court's apparent retreat from the Warren Court's
interpretation of the Bill of Rights has been reviewed by many
commentators with dismay and alarm.' On closer inspection, how-
ever, this retreat seems limited to decisions affecting the practices
of law enforcement officials.2 Cases concerning the fourth, fifth, and
sixth amendments are in sharp contrast, both in substance and
tone, to similar Warren Court decisions.
* The author wishes to acknowledge the financial support of the Canisius College
Faculty Research and Publications Committee. I would also like to thank Charles S.
Desmond, former Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, for kindly giving his
time for a discussion of many issues explored in this article. Finally, I want to make a
special note of thanks to my student research assistant, Robert Klump, who proved to
be not only a thorough researcher, but also a careful critic of the author's prose and
ideas.
00 Chairperson, Dep't of Political Science, Canisius College. Ph.D., University of
Pittsburgh.
1. This dismay is best caught by Professor Leonard Levy in his full length attack
on the Burger Court's criminal procedure decisions. See L. LEvy, AGAINSr THE LAW: THE
NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUsTICE (1974). See generally L. KoIrEsmtr, GOD SAvE Tius
HoNotABLE COURT (1972); J. SIMON, IN His OWN IMAGE: THE SUPREME COURT IN RICHARD
NIXON's AMERICA (1978).
2. See R. FUNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTERREVOLUTION?: THE WARREN COURT AND
THE BURGER COURT: JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN MODERN AMERICA (1977); S. WASBY, CON-
TINUITY AND CHANGE: FROMt THE WARREN COURT TO THE BURGER COURT (1976); Steamer,
Contemporary Supreme Court Directions in Civil Liberties, 92 POL. Sci. Q. 425 (1977).
For the view that the Burger Court is committed to eroding the fourth amendment, see
Nakell, Search of the Person Incident to a Traffic Arrest: A Comment on Robinson and
Gustafson, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 827 (1974). For a view that questions the integrity of the
new Court, see Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on
the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971).
3. Not a single defendant's claim prevailed in eight fourth amendment cases
decided in the 1975 term. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S.
38 (1976); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1976). The Court also ruled in favor of
the government in several fifth amendment cases. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391 (1976); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Garner v. United States,
424 U.S. 648 (1976); Michigan v. Mosley, 428 U.S. 96 (1975). Other cases concerning
criminal justice that were decided pro-government are Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976);
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Another set of reactions to the Burger Court's decisions has
come from state supreme courts, which have apparently grown
comfortable with the philosophy of the Warren Court in the area
of criminal procedure and have refused to follow the Burger Court's
rulings. They have done so by basing their decisions on state con-
stitutional provisions and laws, thereby granting greater protection
to their citizens than is required by the present Supreme Court's
interpretation of the United States Constitution.4 The Supreme
Court's "adequate state grounds" doctrine provides that if there
is an adequate and independent ground for a state court decision,
then even when the state court has also decided a federal question,
the Supreme Court will not review the decision.5
A number of authors have analyzed this development in the
state courts by presenting overviews, 6 by examining the criminal
justice area in the states where significant differences between state
and federal rights have emerged, 7 and by dealing with the pro-
cedural questions and problems connected with this trend.8 The
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); and Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The
1975 term may have been the high water mark for the Burger Court's turn from the
Warren Court's criminal rights revolution. While decisions overall continued to favor
the government in the 1976 term, a significant number of important cases went the
other way. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) and G.M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States, 4g9 U.S. 338 (1977) (search and seizure); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for rape is crud and unusual punishment); Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) and United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564
(1977) (double jeopardy); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 US. 801 (1977) (self-incrimina-
tion); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (right to counsel); Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817 (1977) (prisoner rights).
4. See, e.g., Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d
101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976); State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657
(1971); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974); Commonwealth v. Trip-
lett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975).
5. The doctrinal base for this rule can be found in Murdoch v. City of Memphis,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874), and Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). See also Sandalow,
Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine,
1965 Sup. CT. Rav. 187.
6. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. Rav. 489 (1977); Falk, Foreword: The State Constitution-A More Than Adequate Non-
federal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273 (1973); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional
Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. Rav. 873 (1976); Project Report: Toward
an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HaRv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 271 (1973).
7. See Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of
the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 873 (1975); Wilkes, The New Federalism Revisited, 64 Ky. L.J.
729 (1976).
8. Beatty, State Court Evasion of the United States Supreme Court Mandates During
the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U.L. REv. 260 (1972); Bice, Anderson and
the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 750 (1972); Galie & Galie, State Consti.
tutional Guarantees and Supreme Court Review: Justice Marshall's Proposal in Oregon
v. Hass, 82 DICK. L. Rv. 273 (1978); Note, State Constitutional Guarantees as Adequate
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research in this area to date indicates that California, Pennsylvania,
Michigan, and Alaska have been in the forefront of this indepen-
dence movement.0 The absence of research dealing with each state
separately makes comparative analysis impossible. To help remedy
this situation, and to examine one state, New York, which osten-
sibly has not taken part in this movement in any significant way,
I have chosen the major New York court decisions on criminal
procedure and constitutional law. Specifically, this article will
examine the responses of the New York Court of Appeals to the
Burger Court decisions in the areas of the right to counsel under
the sixth amendment and searches and seizures under the fourth
amendment. Particular controversy has been generated in the
New York courts by the Burger Court interpretations of Mi-
randa v. Arizona,10 United States v. Wade,1
1 Gilbert v. California'2
and Chimel v. California.3 While the focus will be on these areas,
other New York court decisions rejecting Burger Court interpre-
tations of other criminal procedure rights will also be discussed.
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, INTERROGATION, AND "CRITICAL
STAGES": THE WARREN COURT
The major developments introduced by the Warren Court in
the right to counsel area took place between 1960 and 1967.
The Court did, of course, have a few precedents to build on.
In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama,4 though the Court narrowly
limited the application of the sixth amendment, it agreed that the
State Ground: Supreme Court Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 Am. Ciua. L. REv.
737 (1976).
9. See Falk, supra note 6; Wilkes, supra note 7.
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The major progeny of Miranda in the Burger Court include
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977);
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976);
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); and
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 422 (1971).
11. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
12. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). See also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). The Burger
Court decisions are Manson v. Brathwaite, 429 U.S. 1058 (1977), United States v. Ash,
413 U.S. 300 (1973), Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), and Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682 (1972).
13. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See also Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216
(1968); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). The Burger Court decisions are
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974);
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973);
and Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
14. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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right to counsel in a criminal proceeding was "fundamental" and
attached at least at the arraignment stage.'5 Ten years later, in
Betts v. Brady,16 the Court refused to extend Powell and ruled that
no general right to court-appointed counsel existed in state felony
cases. Crooker v. California17 held that persistent questioning by
officers after denial of the defendant's request for counsel was per-
missible as long as any confession obtained was freely and volun-
tarily made.'8 In the companion case, Cicenia v. Lagay,0 the de-
fendant's lawyer had come to the station house and requested to see
his client. The request was denied. Although the defendant was
not as well educated as Crooker had been, and had requested coun-
sel, the Court upheld his conviction, ruling that he enjoyed no
constitutional right to counsel at the interrogation stage.
The Warren Court's expansion of the right to counsel began
with Spano v. New York.2 0 The Court decided the case by determin-
ing the "voluntariness" of the confession, and did not rule on
whether the right to counsel was mandated in the case; but, in con-
curring opinions, four justices supported the view that once a
person is formally charged by indictment or arraignment, he has
a constitutional right to counsel.21 The turning point came with
Gideon v. Wainwright,2 2 where the Court ruled that the right to
counsel was fundamental in all state felony prosecutions. The next
year the Court held in Massiah v. United States2 that the infor-
mant's eavesdropping on the defendant was a violation of the right
to counsel. The crucial factor was the postindictment status of
the defendant.4
It was, however, with Escobedo v. Illinois 21 and Miranda v.
Arizona2 that the "revolution"2 7 took place. The unindicted
15. Id. at 68.
16. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
17. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
18. Id. at 438.
19. 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
20. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
21. Id. at 324-26 (Douglas, J., concurring, joined by Black & Brennan, JJ.; Stewart,
J., concurring, joined by Douglas 9: Brennan, JJ.).
22. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent
held to have constitutional right to appointed counsel for first appeal after conviction).
23. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
24. Id. at 206.
25. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
26. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).




suspect in Escobedo had been refused assistance of counsel during
questioning. Justice Goldberg, in the majority opinion, first said
that "no meaningful distinction can be drawn between interroga-
tion of an accused before and after formal indictment. '" 2 He con-
cluded:
[W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police
carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been de-
nied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police
have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right
to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of
Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion .... 29
Escobedo was in doctrine and by implication a revolutionary
decision;30 in terms of the right to counsel, Miranda represented
a narrowing rather than a broadening of Escobedo. In Miranda,
the Court shifted its emphasis from the sixth to the fifth amend-
ment, creating in the process what has often been called a "fifth
amendment right to counsel."31 The Miranda Court outlined
procedural safeguards in the form of informative warnings that
had to be given to every suspect before any custodial questioning
could take place. The Court also indicated that a person may waive
these rights as long as the waiver is made "voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently. '32 Finally, the Court reasoned that the informa-
tive warnings would "dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings."- 3
Two points are important to note at this juncture. The
first is the Court's shift from the "focus of investigation" to the
"in custody" stage as the crucial time at which one's fifth and sixth
amendment rights come into play. The second is the Court's de-
cision to allow a suspect to waive his rights absent the advice of
counsel while in the hands of the police. The result has been that,
insofar as the Federal Constitution is concerned, the right to coun-
28. 378 U.S. at 486.
29. Id. at 490-91.
80. See Y. KAmIsAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 580 n.3.
31. Comment, The New Definition of a Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel, 14
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 604, 615 (1967).
32. 384 U.S. at 444.
33. Id. at 458.
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sel has lost much of its effectiveness in preindictment proceedings.8 4
While recounting the line of cases linking the right to counsel
to fifth amendment protection, the Court declared in United States
v. Wade: "'
It is central to the constitutional principle that in addition to coun-
sel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not
stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal
or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate
from the accused's right to a fair trial.36
A postindictment lineup is such a "critical stage" at which a
suspect is entitled to counsel. The Court, while ruling that Wade's
counsel should have been notified of the lineup, and that his
presence was "a requisite to conduct of the line-up," allowed for
an "intelligent waiver" of that right as it had in Miranda.s On
the other hand, the taking of handwriting exemplars was not con-
sidered a "critical stage" of the criminal proceedings entitling an
individual to the assistance of counsel.
3 9
Extensions of the right to counsel also occurred in Coleman
v. Alabama,40 where the Court found that a preliminary hearing
was a critical stage, and in Argersinger v. Hamlin,41 in which
Gideon was held to apply to defendants facing a possible jail sen-
tence.42 This ended the steady expansion of constitutional guaran-
tees for the accused. After the accession of Chief Justice Burger, a
34. For evidence that without actual assistance of counsel before interrogation the
Miranda warnings tend to be inconsequential, see 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND
CONFESSIONS OF GUILT (1973); Griffith & Ayres, Faculty Note, A Postscript to the Miranda
Project: Interrogation of Draft Protestors, 77 YALE LJ. 300 (1967); Medalie, Leltz &
Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Imple-
ment Miranda, 66 Micr. L. Rnv. 1347 (1968); Seeberger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh:
A Statistical Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1967); Project, Interrogations in New Haven:
The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967).
35. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
36. Id. at 226.
37. Id. at 237.
38. Id. Waiver of counsel in the Miranda context may be justified by demands of
efficiency, but it is not dear "what comparable value is served by allowing suspects to
waive counsel at the identification process." Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note
27, at 619.
39. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967). In the third case of this trilogy,
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the Court said that the test for judging the fairness
of pretrial identification procedures was whether they were "so unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification" as to deny the defendant due process
of law. Id. at 302.
40. 399 US. 1 (1970).
41. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
42. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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number of decisions deviated significantly from established Warren
Court principles.
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, INTERROGATION,
AND "CRITICAL STAGES": THE BURGER COURT
Harris v. New York43 was the first major case decided by the
Burger Court to raise Miranda questions. In that case, the Court
ruled that voluntary statements, even though made without the
Miranda warning of the right to appointed counsel, are admissible
to impeach a defendant who takes the stand. In Kirby v. Illinois,4
the Court refused to extend the right to counsel to a lineup held
"before the commencement of any prosecution whatever. " 45 The
Court required the initiation of "adversary judicial proceedings." 46
In United States v. Ash,4" the Court ruled that the "sixth amend-
ment does not grant the right to counsel at photographic displays
conducted by the government for the purpose of allowing a witness
to attempt identification of the offender." 48 The Ash doctrine
applies to both preindictment and postindictment photographic
sessions. Unnecessary suggestiveness in identification procedures
alone does not amount to a denial of due process; 49 however, to
determine whether such a denial exists, the "totality of circum-
stances" must be considered.50
In Michigan v. Mosley,51 the Court allowed questioning of an
individual on a matter unrelated to his arrest after the suspect had
exercised his right to remain silent.2 The suspect had been given
Miranda warnings before each interrogation. In Beckwith v. United
States,63 the Court approved the procedure used by FBI agents
who had given less than full warnings before questioning a suspect
in his home because the interrogation itself was not custodial or
coercive. In Oregon v. Mathiason,4 a suspect on parole was asked
43. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
44. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
45. Id. at 690.
46. Id. at 688.
47. 413 U.S. 800 (1973).
48. Id. at 321.
49. Manson v. Brathwaite, 429 U.S. 1058 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
50. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
51. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
52. But cf. id. at 118-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that the matters were
not unrelated).
53. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
54. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
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by a police officer to come to his office for questioning. The suspect
complied and was told first that he was not under arrest, and then,
after the questioning, that he was free to go. Although the ques-
tioning took place in the state patrol office and the officer falsely
stated that Mathiason's fingerprints were found at the scene, the
Court ruled that the suspect had not been "in custody" as required
by Miranda. The Court did, however, rely on Miranda in Doyle
v. Ohio5 in ruling that a defendant's postarrest silence after he
received Miranda warnings could not be used against him in any
subsequent proceedings.
Recently, in Brewer v. Williams,56 the Court, eschewing Mi-
randa, reversed a conviction on sixth amendment grounds. In so
doing, it summarized what appears to be current constitutional
law on the right to counsel: "[O]nce adversary proceedings have
commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal repre-
sentation when the government interrogates him .... [A]n accused
can voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to
have counsel present at an interrogation after counsel has been
appointed.
57
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE WARREN COURT
The Burger Court's divergence from the doctrine of the
Warren Court has nowhere been so great as it has in the area of
warrantless searches and seizures: those incident to a lawful arrest;
those based on probable cause; those conducted in exigent circum-
stances; and those of inventories after arrest.
The Warren Court's position was delineated in Chimel v.
California,58 Preston v. United States,59 and Dyke v. Taylor Imple-
ment Manufacturing Co.60 Chimel established that a search incident
to a lawful arrest must be limited to the "arrestee's person and the
area 'within his immediate control' "61-the area in which the
arrestee may be able to reach for a weapon or destroy evidence.
In Vale v. Louisiana,62 the Court added the condition that "[a]
55. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
56. 480 U.S. 387 (1977).
57. Id. at 401-03 (footnote and citation omitted).
58. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
59. 876 U.S. 364 (1964).
60. 891 U.S. 316 (1968).
61. 895 U.S. at 768 (citation omitted).
62. 899 U.S. 80 (1970).
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search may be incident to an arrest 'only if it is substantially con-
temporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate
vicinity of the arrest.' 63 The Warren Court did, however, con-
tinue to accept the "exigent circumstances" exception to the war-
rant requirement."
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE BURGER COURT
The Burger Court's response began with United States v.
Robinson, 5 where the Court upheld a full-blown search of a sus-
pect subsequent to his arrest for operating an automobile without
a permit: "A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause
is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that in-
trusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no
additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which
establishes the authority to search ....,60
With Robinson, the connection between the nature of the
crime and the items sought in the search was apparently severed.
In the companion case of Gustafson v. Florida,67 the Court upheld
the search of a traffic offense suspect that yielded marijuana by
officers authorized to arrest or issue a ticket. In other decisions of
this type over the past several years, the Court has allowed the
warrantless seizure of an automobile at a private garage over two
hours after its owner was arrested;68 the warrantless search of an
automobile on its arrival at a police station after its owner's arrest,
even though he refused to consent to the search; 69 the warrantless
general inventory search of an impounded vehicle following its
seizure for parking violations; 70 the warrantless arrest of a de-
fendant based on probable cause, even though the arresting officers
had ample time to obtain a warrant prior to the arrest;7' an order
63. Id. at 33 (citations omitted). The Court reaffirmed the doctrine enunciated in
Preston: "Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another
place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest." Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. at 367 (citation omitted).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 448 (1976) (Marshall, J., joined
by Brennan, J., dissenting); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. at 773 (White, J., dissenting).
65. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
66. Id. at 235.
67. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
68. Cady v. Dombrowski, 418 U.S. 433 (1973).
69. Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
70. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
71. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
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commanding a suspect stopped for a routine offense to leave his
car and submit to a "patdown" search, despite the fact that the
officers in the case had no reason to suspect foul play. 2 In United
States v. Chadwick,7 3 however, the Court declared the search of
a footlocker in the trunk of an automobile a violation of the fourth
amendment. The Court considered a footlocker in a vehicle, for
purposes of fourth amendment searches, distinct from the vehicle
itself, and thus entitled to more protection than the vehicle.
The decisions of the Burger Court have not specifically over-
ruled preceding Warren Court decisions in these areas. Considered
collectively, however, the cases clearly indicate significant doctrinal
shifts between the two Courts concerning safeguards required by
the fourth amendment.
V. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND AUTOMOBILES:
ABANDON ALL HOPE, YE WHO ENTER THEMI
Both Robinson and Gustafson have created a number of prob-
lems with searches incident to lawful arrests for traffic infractions.
The doctrine enunciated in those cases was essentially that given
any lawful custodial arrest, a full search of the arrestee is not only
an exception to the warrant requirements of the fourth amend-
ment, but is also "reasonable" under that amendment. Under this
standard, a search could be conducted not only for weapons, but
also for incriminating evidence unrelated to the initial arrest. The
ramifications of this doctrine are readily apparent. Arrests for
traffic offenses are common,74 and a technical and strict application
of those regulations could give police reason to stop a large segment
of our mobile population.75 Moreover, the possibility of pretext
arrests has been greatly enhanced. These and other problems
72. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 US. 106 (1977).
73. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
74. The New York State Police report that traffic offenses accounted for ten times
more arrests than all other offenses combined, approximately 491,000 to 44,000. Note, After
United States v. Robinson: Effect on New York Law, 39 Ar. L. Rv. 895, 905 (1975).
75. "Very few drivers can traverse any appreciable distance without violating some
traffic regulation." B. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASEs 65 (1969).
76. That subterfuge is employed had been clearly established even before Robinson.
See W. LAFAVE, ARREsr 151 (1965); L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENuRG, DETEC-
TION OF CRIME 141 (1967); Project, Marijuana Laws: An Empirical Study of Enforcement
and Administration in Los Angeles County, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1499, 1533--35 (1968).
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have been noted by numerous commentators7 7 and a number of
state courts have not followed the Robinson rule.7
The leading case in New York before Robinson was People
v. Marsh.79 Speaking for a unanimous court of appeals, Chief Judge
Fuld wrote:
There is no question, and the entire court agrees, that a police
officer is not authorized to conduct a search every time he stops a
motorist for speeding or some other ordinary traffic infraction. It
is urged, however, that the officer is empowered to conduct a search,
as incident to a lawful arrest, when the defendant is taken into
custody for a traffic violation on a warrant of arrest, following his
failure to appear in court pursuant to the summons initially issued.
We find no basis for making such a distinction, concluding as we
do that it not only would offend against the legislative design for
the treatment of traffic offenders but would also exceed constitu-
tional limits on search and seizure.80
The court found a constitutional basis for this restriction: "Indeed,
this conclusion is also dictated by the constitutional prohibition
against 'unreasonable searches and seizures.' "I" Marsh not only
explicitly rejected the reasoning that would be used and the con-
clusion that would be reached by the Supreme Court in Robinson
and Gustafson, but imposed a stricter standard than even the dis-
senters in Robinson were later to recommend. Justice Marshall,
dissenting in Robinson, would have allowed a limited search for
weapons. But Marsh held that
no search for a weapon is authorized as incident to an arrest for
a traffic infraction, regardless of whether the arrest is made on the
77. See, e.g., Aaronson S. Wallace, A Reconsideration of the Fourth Amendment's
Doctrine of Search Incident to Arrest, 64 GEo. L. REv. 53 (1975); Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MANN. L. Rlv. 349 (1974); LaFave, "Case by Case Adjudi-
cation" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Cr. REv. 127;
Nakell, supra note 2; Comment, Search Incident to Arrest: United States v. Robinson-An
Analytical View, 7 CONN. L. Rv. 346 (1975); Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of
Automobiles, 87 HARv. L. Rv. 835 (1974); Note, Searches of the Person Incident to Traffic
Arrests: State and Federal Approaches, 26 HASTNGS L.J. 536 (1974); Note, Restricting the
Scope of Searches Incident to Arrest: United States v. Robinson, 59 VA. L. Rlv. 724 (1973).
78. Before Robinson, a clear majority of state courts that had dealt with search
incident to arrest in a traffic infraction context had refused to validate such searches auto-
matically. For a full list of state court cases, see Note, Searches of the Person Incident to
Traffic Arrest: State and Federal Approaches, supya note 77, at 536 n.19. Some states have
continued this policy in spite of Robinson, and others, rejecting Robinson, have adopted
this approach for the first time. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099,
119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975); State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 369, 520 P.2d 51, 58 (1974);
State v. Dubay, 388 A.2d 797, 799, 802 (Me. 1975).
79. 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967).
80. Id. at 100, 228 N.E.2d at 785, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
81. Id. at 102, 228 N.E.2d at 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 793 (citations omitted).
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scene or pursuant to a warrant, unless the officer has reason to fear
an assault or probable cause for believing that his prisoner has
committed a crime.82
Additionally, the court made it clear that traffic infractions like
speeding do not ipso facto give that reason to fear.83
New York's position in 1967 gave its citizens a greater degree
of freedom from searches incident to traffic arrests than existed in
most states.8 4 The court went even further in 1973 when it stated
in People v. Adams 8 8 that an arrest for a misdemeanor under sec-
tion 442 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law 8 l "without
more, will not sustain [a] search. ' ' s8 The suspect had been arrested
because his vehicle's identification number had been altered. Re-
lying heavily on Preston v. United States8 and the court of appeals
decision in Robinson, 9 the court ruled that since there had been
neither instrumentalities nor evidence of the crime for which the
suspect had been arrested, and since there was no evidence that
the suspect had posed a danger to the arresting officer, the search
could not be justified. Although the court in Adams mentioned
Marsh as a precedent, it is not clear to what extent the decision
rested on adequate state grounds. Moreover, the court's heavy reli-
ance on Robinson, Preston, and other federal cases seems to indicate
that the court's decision was based on the Federal Constitution.
Adams also marked the beginning of a division of opinion
among the judges of the New York Court of Appeals. Judge Jasen,
in dissent, argued that Adams was clearly distinguishable from
Marsh because the underlying crime in the former had been a mis-
demeanor, whereas in the latter it had been a traffic infraction.
This distinction was at the heart of the reasoning in Marsh, Judge
Jasen claimed, and simply did not apply in the case of a misde-
meanor.90
82. Id.
88. Id. at 101, 228 N.E.2d at 785, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
84. A constitutionally sanctioned limited search, such as the one approved by the
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was not available to the Marsh court,
but comments in the later case of People v. Adams, 82 N.Y.2d 451, 454, 299 N.E.Rd 653,
654-55, 846 N.Y.S.2d 229, 281 (1978), indicated that such a search accompanying an arrest
for a traffic infraction might be acceptable.
85. 82 N.Y.2d 451, 299 N.E.2d 658, 846 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1973).
86. N.Y. VEH. & TLF. LAW § 442 (McKinney 1970).
87. 82 N.Y.2d at 455, 299 N.E.2d at 655, 846 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
88. 376 U.S. 864 (1964).
89. 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
90. 82 N.Y.2d at 456, 299 N.E.2d at 656, 846 N.Y.S.2d at 282 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
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Judge Jasen's plea for limiting Marsh to traffic infractions was
partially vindicated in People v. Weintraub,91 where Judge Jasen,
writing for the majority, refused to extend Marsh and Adams to an
arrest based on a trespass, a violation, or misdemeanor under New
York law. Weintraub was the first case after Robinson in which
the court of appeals examined this question, and the effect of Rob-
inson was pronounced. Judge Jasen noted that "insofar as the hold-
ings of Marsh and Adams are predicated on the Federal Constitu-
tion, they must be read with the Supreme Court's decision in the
Robinson case." 93 The questionable status that this remark un-
doubtedly bestowed on Marsh and Adams provoked Judge Wacht-
ler, in a concurring opinion, to emphasize that the court of appeals
holding in Marsh had been "primarily an expression of state policy
found in the state constitution and the legislative intent underlying
the arrest provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law stands firmly
on that ground alone. 94
That same term, the court further eroded the Marsh doctrine
in People v. Perel.9 5 After noting that "an arrest for a particular
offense may not carry with it the right to engage in a full-blown
search of the person or his belongings, because as a matter of State
law such searches are found to be unreasonable,"96 the court held
that an inventory and search of the personal effects of a suspect
while he is in custody is permissible. Given the gross nature of the
initial intrusion that occurs when a person is detained, "it is reason-
able to conduct a less intrusive search of his person and the posses-
sions he carried with him.197 The court added, "[i]f logic, to the
minds of some, may not seem to compel the rule, history supports
it and precedents justify it."'
The stage was then set for the direct confrontation of doctrine
in People v. Troiano.9 9 The court unanimously decided that a
search incident to a lawful arrest for a traffic misdemeanor was
constitutional. There was a dispute, however, among the judges
concerning the bearing of Troiano on Marsh and Adams. Judge
91. 35 N.Y.2d 351, 320 N.EX2d 636, 361 N.YS.2d 897 (1974).
92. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.05, 140.10, 140.15 (McKinney 1970).
93. 35 N.Y.2d at 353, 320 NE.2d at 637, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
94. Id. at 355, 320 N.E2d at 638, 361 N.YS.2d at 900-01 (Wachtler, J., concurring).
95. 34 N.Y.2d 462, 315 N.E.2d 452, 358 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1974).
96. Id. at 468, 315 NX.2d at 456, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 389 (citing People v. Marsh) (other
citations omitted).
97. Id. at 467, 315 N.E.2d at 456, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
98. Id.
99. 35 N.Y.2d 476, 323 NE.2d 183, 363 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1974).
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Breitel's majority opinion, joined by Judges Jasen, Jones, and
Stevens, was sweeping in its language, relying heavily on the reason-
ing of Robinson:
So long as the person is being taken into custody, he has lost
whatever interest in privacy he had before arrest, the taking into
custody itself being the grossest intrusion upon his privacy ....
Still further, there is no doubt that once the arrested person is
taken to the place of detention a full inventory search is merited
for his protection and that of his property, as well as for the safety
of his custodians ....
In short, so long as an arrest is lawful, the consequent exposure
to search is inevitable.100
Insofar as Marsh had already been confined to traffic infrac-
tions, Troiano broke no new ground; but Adams' extension of
Marsh to misdemeanors was overruled by Troiano. The majority
hinted at what might be left of Marsh when it noted: "There is,
perhaps, an area of traffic violation 'arrest' where a full-blown
search is not justified, but it might seem to be confined to a situa-
tion where an arrest was not necessary because an alternative
summons was available or because the arrest was a suspect pre-
text."' 01 One could read Troiano as rejecting Gustafson, where the
officer had discretion to either arrest or issue a summons, and the
offense was driving without a license-an infraction under New
York State law. It may be precisely in this situation that Troiano
would preclude a full-blown search. The court, seemingly uncom-
fortable with the discretion its opinion would give to the police,
added that "[i]f the unnecessarily intrusive personal search is to
be restricted, the cure might be by limiting the right to arrest or
to take into custody.
1 0 2
Judge Rabin's concurring opinion 103 went to great lengths
to save Adams as well as Marsh. He pointed out that while the
federal underpinning might be gone, the rationale for Marsh, based
on the state constitution and legislative intent, still retained vi-
tality. 104 He stated that the law in this area should remain as follows:
(1) an arrest based solely on a traffic infraction, will not, without
more, authorize a frisk for weapons, whether the arrestee is taken
100. Id. at 478, 323 N.E.2d at 184-85, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
101. Id. at 478, 323 N.E.2d at 185, 863 N.Y.S.2d at 945 (citations omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id. Judges Gabrielli and Wachtler joined in Judge Rabin's opinion.
104. Id. at 479, 323 N.E.2d at 186, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 946 (Rabin, J., concurring).
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into custody or not; (2) a proper custodial arrest for a traffic mis-
demeanor will authorize a police officer to conduct a frisk appro-
priate to the discovery of weapons; (3) if based solely upon a cus-
todial arrest for a traffic misdemeanor for which a search for
evidence is not appropriate, the extent of a search of the person
incident to that arrest must initially be limited to a frisk of the
body and clothing of the arrestee; and (4) if such a frisk reveals an
object that might reasonably be thought to be a weapon, or if there
is some other basis supporting a reasonable belief that a weapon
may be present, the officer may go beyond a frisk in order to ascer-
tain whether weapons are present.105
It seems likely, however, that the Troiano majority rejected the
first point. If the arrest is made, some search will be justified.
The status of Marsh was not clarified by Troiano. The re-
marks of the majority do not adequately address a number of
problems. Under New York law, police officers are given the right
to make custodial arrests for all traffic infractions, but the exercise
of the right is in their discretion;"" they may choose to issue only
an appearance ticket, or what is commonly known as a summons
or "ticket.1' 07 Does Troiano give us a standard for judging this
discretionary power? It seems to stop short of the permissive doc-
trine of Robinson, but the extent to which that limitation means
anything is problematic. If a police officer has the discretion to
issue an appearance ticket to one driver and arrest another, then
the problems commentators have noted concerning Robinson 108
are not eliminated by the New York position. The person issued
the ticket drives off, freedom intact, to answer the summons with
dignity. The arrested violator is handcuffed, placed in police cus-
tody, and put through the delay and indignity of the arrest pro-
cedure-all because he has committed a traffic infraction, or
because the police would like to search him. Troiano can be in-
terpreted, however, to make the latter situation illegal. At least
one lower New York court thought Troiano meant that without
probable cause to believe that an offender is guilty of more than
a simple traffic infraction, or unless there are special circumstances
in addition to the commission of that traffic infraction, police will
105. Id. at 483, 323 N.E.2d at 188, 363 N.YS.2d at 949 (Rabin, J., concurring).
106. For the conditions under which a warrantless arrest may be made, see N.Y.
Cmrax. PRoc. LAw § 140.10 (McKinney 1971).
107. N.Y. VEH. & TRAr. LAW § 226 (McKinney 1970).
108. See note 77 supra.
1979]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
not be permitted to deviate from that ordinary procedure of sum-
moning a defendant." 9
In People v. Copeland,n0 the supreme court, although revers-
ing the lower court's suppression of evidence, reaffirmed the traffic
infraction exception to searches and seizures incident to lawful
arrests. The court reasoned that the "special circumstances" in
this case included the "recklessly dangerous conduct which . . .
justif[ied] an arrest." ' - The New York Court of Appeals affirmed
in a memorandum opinion, intimating that the reasoning of the
lower court was acceptable: "Without the available data on which
to prepare a uniform traffic summons and confronted with a driver
of a weaving car who possessed no operator's license, we can only
conclude that the arrest was warranted .... "112
In the most recent case of a traffic arrest, the court of appeals,
in another memorandum opinion, seemed to move closer to the
Gustafson position."3 The defendant was stopped for driving
through a red light. Although he was not under arrest, the police
searched his automobile and discovered contraband. The court
declared the search illegal because the suspect had not been placed
under arrest, but it implied that if the officer had arrested the
suspect, the search would have been legitimate: "A search inci-
dent to arrest is justified in the interest of protecting the officer's
safety by assuring that a defendant, in custody, has no weapons
or other instruments which might be used to assault the officers
"1114or effect escape ....
What then is left of the Marsh position? Perhaps no more
than the one point on which all the judges of the court of appeals
agreed when that case was decided, "that a police officer is not
authorized to conduct a search every time he stops a motorist for
speeding or some other ordinary traffic infraction.""" The pat-
tern and direction marked by subsequent decisions are clear,
however. Before Robinson, the high water mark of state doctrinal
independence in this area was reached in Adams. After Robinson,
109. People v. Copeland, 82 Misc. 2d 12, 370 N.Y.S2d 775 (App. T. 1975), aff'd mem.,
39 N.Y.2d 986, 855 N.E.2d 228, 387 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1976).
110. 82 Misc. 2d 12, 370 N.Y.S.2d 775 (App. T. 1975), afl'd mem., 89 N.Y.2d 986,
355 NYE.2d 228, 887 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1976).
111. Id. at 15, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
112. 39 N.Y.2d at 986-87, 355 N.E.2d at 228, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
113. People v. Erwin, 42 N.Y.2d 1064, 369 N.E.2d 1170, 899 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1977).
114. Id. at 1065, 869 N.E.2d at 1171, 899 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (citations omitted).
115. 20 N.Y.2d at 100, 228 N.E2.d at 785, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
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the court began to move closer to the federal position and the ex-
tent of the difference between the two is at present undefinable.116
The doctrine so boldy announced in Marsh has been muted to
little more than a whisper by subsequent court qualifications and
limitations; the effect on prior New York doctrine awaits more
definite elaboration by the court of appeals.
1 17
116. Lest one get the impression that the New York situation is one of almost com-
plete retreat in this area, People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67
(1975), should be noted. The case involved the issue of whether a police officer may
arbitrarily stop an automobile solely for the purpose of examining the motorist's license
and registration or inspecting the vehicle for equipment violations. Though noting the
discretionary language of the statute authorizing such inspections, and court decisions
reading the statute to authorize such stops, the court of appeals determined that "an
arbitrary stop of a single automobile for a purportedly 'routine traffic check' is imper-
missible unless the police officer reasonably suspects a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law." Id. at 419, 330 N.E.2d at 43, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 74. The standard of reasonable suspicion
assigned by the court was that of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The court has con-
tinued to adhere to this standard. See People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559, 373 N.E.2d 1218,
402 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1978); People v. Joe, 63 A.D.2d 739, 405 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1978). In none
of these cases was the state constitution specifically invoked as the basis for the decision.
Recently, the Supreme Court held that police cannot constitutionally subject motorists
to seizures on the basis of random checks of automobiles. Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct.
1391 (1979). Justice White, writing for an eight to one majority, stated that the absence
of either a factual basis for suspicion directed at a particular automobile, or some sub-
stantial objective standard to control the exercise of discretion "would invite intrusions
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights." Id. at 1400. This may represent a departure
from earlier federal cases upholdifig state statutes that grant police sweeping authority
to spot check automobiles. For a discussion of previous federal cases, see Note, Nonarrest
Automobile Stops: Unconstitutional Seizures of the Person, 25 STAN. L. REv. 865, 870-71
nn.33 & 34 (1973). For a similar list of state cases, see Note, Commonwealth v. Swanger-
Spot Checks Eliminated, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 640, 643-44 n.32 (1974). In 1976, Texas joined
those states in making such stops illegal. Faulkner v. State, 549 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1976). In 1978, Delaware also rejected the legality of such stops in Prouse.
117. The New York Court of Appeals has followed the general principles established
by the Burger Court in other fourth amendment areas. It had accepted vehicular inventory
searches even before South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). See People v.
Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971); People v. Lawrence, 53
A.D.2d 705, 384 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1976); People v. Middleton, 50 A.D.2d 1040, 377 N.Y.S.2d
938 (1975), aff'd mem., 43 N.Y.2d 703, 372 N.E.2d 41, 401 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1977); People v.
Martin, 48 A.D.2d 213, 368 N.Y.S2d 342 (1975); People v. Butler, 44 A.D.2d 413, 355
N.Y.S.2d 172 (1974), af'd mem., 36 N.Y.2d 990, 337 N.E.2d 120, 374 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1975);
People v. Rivera, 72 Misc. 2d 307, 339 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1972). The New York
courts have also followed the Supreme Court positions as set forth in Chambers v. Ma-
roncy, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), and Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 US. 583 (1974). See People v. Kreichman, 37 N.Y.2d 693, 339 N.E.2d 182,
376 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975); People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254, 298 N.E.2d 78, 344 N.Y.S2d
900 (1973); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert.




VI. COUNSEL, SELF-INCRIMINATION, AND CONSENT:
CHEMICAL TESTS FOR INTOXICATION
The strong right to counsel tradition under New York law 118
has carried over into situations in which the police request a
motorist to submit to chemical tests to determine whether his
blood alcohol level renders him legally inebriated. In People v.
Gursey," 9 the court of appeals considered whether in such a situa-
tion a suspect has a right to consult counsel before taking the
blood alcohol level test. Its analysis began with a principle first
enunciated in People v. Ianniello:120 "As a matter of fairness,
government ought not compel individuals to make binding de-
cisions concerning their legal rights in the enforced absence of
counsel .... ,u21 Relying on this principle, Escobedo, and People
v. Donovan,122 the court argued that drunk driving cases were in
the class of "binding decisions concerning [an individual's] legal
rights"'23 that triggered a limited right to counsel. The court
recognized, however, that the two hour limitation on the adminis-
tration of the test 24 made granting an absolute right to counsel
impractical, and concluded:
The privilege of consulting with counsel concerning the exercise
of legal rights should not, however, extend so far as to palpably
impair or nullify the statutory procedure requiring drivers to choose
between taking the test or losing their licenses .... Where the
defendant wishes only to telephone his lawyer or consult with a
lawyer present in the station house or immediately available there,
no danger of delay is posed. But to be sure, there can be no recog-
nition of an absolute right to refuse the test until a lawyer reaches
the scene . ... 125
The court based its decision on state statutory law and federal
precedents concerning the right to counsel. With Gursey, as with
Marsh, the New York Court of Appeals clearly went beyond the
118. See text accompanying notes 148-51 infra.
119. 22 N.Y.2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1968).
120. 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 439, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968).
121. Id. at 424, 235 N.E.2d at 443, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
122. 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963). See text accompanying
notes 159-63 infra.
123. 22 N.Y.2d at 227-28,239 N.E.2d at 352, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
124. N.Y. VEH. & TAr. LAW § 1192 () (McKinney 1970) (current version at N.Y.
VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194.1 (2) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1978)).
125. 22 N.Y.2d at 229, 239 N.E.2d at 353, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
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requirements of the Federal Constitution and beyond the require-
ments demanded by the courts in most other states.
12 6
In the 1971 decision of People v. Craft,27 the court, though
not overruling Gursey, did limit the scope of its application. Craft
claimed that the failure to give him his Miranda warnings before
he took the blood test was a violation of his right to counsel and his
right against self-incrimination. Relying on Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia,128 the court declined to grant any right to counsel at this
stage since "there [was] neither need nor reason for presence of
counsel."' 2 The difference between Gursey and Craft, the court
pointed out, was that while a request for a lawyer must be honored
within reasonable time limits, no affirmative obligation to in-
form a suspect that he has the right is constitutionally man-
dated. Thus, the court has continued to sustain Gursey on state
grounds,'30 but has created a dichotomy between the strong pro-
tection given those who either already have or request counsel
and a more limited protection for those who do not.
The chemical test for intoxication has raised constitutional
issues in the fifth amendment area as well. In People v. Paddock,'3'
the court of appeals ruled that a motorist's refusal to take the
blood test may not be admitted into evidence at a subsequent
trial on a charge of driving while intoxicated. The court relied
heavily on People v. Stratton'3 2 which had interpreted section
71-a of the Vehicle and Traffic Law 13 as giving a right to refuse
126. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), explicitly rejected a right to the
assistance of counsel at this point. Id. at 766. The general rule in the states is that a
defendant is not entitled to the assistance of counsel because he has no legal right to refuse
to take the test under Schmerber and because of implied consent legislation. See 2 R.
ERWIN, DEFENSE or DRUNK DRIvING CASES § 32.03 (3d ed. 1978). The state court cases that
adhere to this rule are as follows: Cogdill v. Department of Pub. Safety, 135 Ga. App.
339, 217 S.E.2d 502 (1975); State v. Severino, 56 Haw. 378, 537 P.2d 1187 (1975); Swenum-
son v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Safety, 210 N.W.2d 660 (Iowa 1973); Spradling v. Deimeke,
528 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. 1975); Lewis v. Nebraska State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 191 Neb.
704, 217 N.W.2d 177 (1974); McNulty v. Curry, 42 Ohio St. 2d 341, 71 Ohio Op. 2d 317,
328 N.E2d 798 (1975); State v. Carson, 512 P.2d 825 (Okla. Crim. 1973); Commonwealth
Dep't of Transp. v. Cannon, 4 Pa. Commw. Ct. 119, 286 A.2d 24 (1972); Law v. City of
Danville, 212 Va. 702, 187 S.W.2d 197 (1972).
127. 28 N.Y.2d 274, 270 N.E2d 297, 321 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1971).
128. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
129. 28 N.Y.2d at 278, 270 N.E.2d at 300, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
130. The principle established in Gursey was also applied by lower New York courts
in Leopold v. Tofany, 68 Misc. 2d 3, 325 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1971), and People v.
Huelin, 85 Misc. 2d 139, 378 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Suffolk County Ct. 1975).
131. 29 N.Y.2d 504, 272 N.E.2d 486, 323 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1971).
132. 286 A.D. 323, 143 N.YS.2d 362 (1955), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 664, 133 N.E.2d 516, 159
N.Y.S.2d 29 (1956).
133. Section 71-a of the former Vehicle and Traffic Law read: "If such person having
been placed under arrest and having therefore been requested to submit to such chemical
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to take the test, and ruled that the right would be rendered
meaningless if comment in court on that refusal were allowed.134
Judge Jasen, in a concurring opinion, questioned the con-
tinued viability of the Stratton ruling. He noted that insofar as
Stratton rested on the Federal Constitution, Schmerber rendered
it untenable: "[S]ince there is no constitutional right to refuse to
submit to such a test ... there can be no constitutional prohibi-
tion to prevent comment upon the accused's failure to take the
test."' 35 The court in Stratton had misread the intent of the legis-
lature in allowing an individual to refuse to take the test, accord-
ing to Judge Jasen, and since "Stratton rests solely upon this
statutory basis, the Legislature may, if it be so advised, correct
this situation."'18
In 1973, the New York State Legislature did revise section
1194, the current version of section 71-a, making clear its intent
to allow evidence in court of a refusal to take the test.18 7 If Judge
Jasen's interpretation of Schmerber is correct, then both Stratton
and Paddock are no longer good law. Subsequent to the legisla-
tive revision, lower courts have divided on the question of the
continued viability of Paddock. In People v. Smith,8 8 for example,
a county court ruled that since a defendant has no constitutional
right to refuse to take a chemical test after being arrested for driving
while intoxicated,13 he has no right to have mention of that refusal
tests, refuses to submit to such chemical tests, the test shall not be given but the Com-
missioner shall revoke his license ...." 1953 N.Y. Laws, ch. 854, § 71-a (repealed 1959).
This provision was adopted verbatim by the present law in N.Y. VEH. & TRA. LAw §
1194.2 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1978).
134. Stratton also relied on New York's self-incrimination laws. Id. at 332, 143
N.Y.S.2d at 365 (citing People v. Hyman, 284 A.D.2d 347, 131 N.Y.S.2d 691, afl'd, 308
N.Y. 794, 125 N.E.2d 597 (1955)).
135. 29 N.Y.2d at 505, 272 N.E.2d at 486, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
136. Id. at 506, 272 N.E.2d at 487, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
137. Under this amendment, the following language was added to § 1194: "Evidence
of a refusal to submit to such chemical test shall be admissible in any trial ...upon
showing that the person was given sufficient warning, in clear and unequivocal language,
of the effect of such refusal and that the person persisted in his refusal." N.Y. VE &:
TRAP. LAw § 1194.4 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1978).
138. 79 Misc. 2d 172, 359 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Broome County Ct. 1974).
139. Id. at 173, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 447-48; accord, People v. Rosenthal, 87 Misc. 2d
186, 384 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Dist. Ct. 1976). Rosenthal also discussed the interesting question
of whether the results of sobriety tests should be suppressed when the subject has not
received Miranda warnings. The court held that "[i]n the light of the abundance of
authority finding the performance or [sic] sobriety tests to be without the protection of
the Miranda warnings ... the performance test given by defendant [should] not be
suppressed." Id. at 190, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 361; accord, People v. Mosher, 93 Misc. 2d 179,
402 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Webster Town Ct. 1978); People v. Bartlett, 82 Misc. 2d 152, 868
N.Y.S.2d 799 (Yates County Ct. 1975) (failure to give Miranda warnings will not prevent
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excluded from the trial.140 Furthermore, the court suggested that
the statutory basis for Paddock had been removed by the 1973
amendment to section 1194.141
The most significant case holding the refusal to take the blood
test inadmissible at trial is People v. Rodriguez.142 In reviewing
Stratton and Paddock, the court took issue with Judge Jasen's in-
terpretation of Paddock, arguing that he had misread Schmerber.
While submission to the test is not testimonial, the court said,
refusal to submit is testimonial, and "[i]t follows therefrom that
to make admissible the defendant's failure to take the prescribed
test is violative of his rights under the Fifth Amendment."''1  In
People v. Delaney,' the court examined section 1193-a of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law, and held that it violated the federal
privilege against self-incrimination. Section 1193-a requires a
motorist who has been in an accident to submit to a breath test;
145
if he refuses, he is given a summons and allowed to proceed. 46
Since "the only reason for asking the motorist to take a breath
test" is to help the officer decide whether the defendant should be
arrested, and the "sole and only function [of the test] is to incrimi-
nate," the court held the provision unconstitutional.
47
At present, there has been no reconciliation of these disparate
decisions by the lower courts in New York. The applicability of
Miranda and Schmerber to chemical intoxication tests is unclear.
What is clear, however, is that none of the lower court opinions
have relied on New York State constitutional guarantees. It seems
unlikely either that Rodriguez will survive appellate court con-
admission of blood test results, though statements made at time of test may be suppressed).
But see People v. Houghland, 79 Misc. 2d 868, 861 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Dist. Ct. 1974).
140. Id. at 173, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 447-48. The majority rule is that "since compelled
chemical test evidence violates no privilege against self-incrimination . .. evidence that
one accused of intoxication refused to take a chemical test is admissible." 2 R. ERwIN, supra
note 126, § 31.02. But see notes 152-63 & accompanying text infra.
141. 79 Misc. 2d at 174, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
142. 80 Misc. 2d 1060, 364 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
143. Id. at 1064, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 791. In contrast to Rodriguez, the court in People
v. Mosher, 93 Misc. 2d 179, 180, 402 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (Webster Town Ct. 1977), said
that making a distinction between refusal to take the test, which would be admissible,
and the words "I refuse," which would not be admissible, is a theory that "strains ration-
ality." For cases discussing the inadmissibility of a refusal to take a chemical analysis
test after arrest for driving while intoxicated, and the possible effects of waiver, see
People v. Johnson, 89 Misc. 2d 53, 387 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1976), and People
v. Houghland, 79 Misc. 2d 868, 861 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Dist. Ct. 1974).
144. 83 Misc. 2d 576, 373 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Dist. Ct. 1975).
145. N.Y. vi. & TaAF. LAW § 1193-a (McKinney Supp. 1978).
146. 83 Misc. 2d at 577, 873 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
147. Id. at 579, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
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sideration on federal constitutional grounds, or that the New
York Court of Appeals will resurrect Stratton on state constitu-
tional grounds.
VII. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In our discussions of New York statutes and of the modem
constitutional constructions by the United States Supreme Court,
we must not forget that in our State the right to counsel was an-
nounced and insisted upon in much older case law. 48
A. Counsel and Interrogation: 1960-1978
The protection of the right to counsel has an extensive and
rich history in New York, and the task of making that right a
reality has been taken seriously by the courts in the state. 4 This
tradition has been continued in recent years. Although the New
York Court of Appeals was reversed by the Supreme Court in
Spano v. New York, 0  the court, in a series of cases beginning
with People v. Di Biasi,'51 not only went beyond the requirements
of the federal courts, but explicitly based its decisions on the state
as well as the Federal Constitution.
The Supreme Court in Spano, relying on the traditional
voluntariness standard, did not decide whether any postindictment
confession given in the absence of counsel could be used without
violating a defendant's constitutional rights. Di Biasi resolved the
question: "we do not think we are concluded by this court's de-
cision in Spano. We think this questioning was a violation of
148. People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 396-97, 207 N.E.2d 358, 361, 259 N.Y.S2d
416 (1965) (Desmond, C.J.).
149. See, e.g., People v. Marincic, 2 N.Y.2d 181, 139 N.E.2d 529, 158 N.Y.S.2d 569
(1957) (though defendant bad been informed of her right to counsel at every stage of the
proceeding, in order for the right to be effective "the court must make it clear to a
defendant . . . that her right is not only to have counsel if she so wishes but also to
have all further proceedings postponed until she shall have consulted with counsel and
taken his advice," id. at 184, 139 N.E.2d at 530, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 571); People v. Mc-
Laughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 53 N.E.2d 356 (1944) (right to counsel requires that defendant
have a "reasonable time and a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice," id.
at 483, 53 N.E.2d at 357). See also People v. Shenandoah, 9 N.Y.2d 75, 172 N.E.2d 548,
211 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1961); People v. Banner, 5 N.Y.2d 109, 154 N.E.2d 553, 180 N.Y.S.2d
292 (1958); People v. Palmer, 296 N.Y. 324, 73 N.E.2d 533 (1947) (the right to counsel
may be waived); People v. Brantle, 13 A.D.2d 839, 216 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1961). New York's
concern in this area became apparent almost from the beginning of the state's history
by the requirement that counsel be assigned to the poor. See People v. Witenski, 15
N.Y.2d 392, 397, 207 N.E.2d 358, 361, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413, 416 (1965).
150. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
151. 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).
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this defendant's constitutional rights ..... 152 Although the court
did not explicitly rely on the state constitution or state statutes,
its decision was clearly a step away from the traditional volun-
tariness standard that had been used by the Supreme Court since
Brown v. Mississippi.5 3 In subsequent cases, the court explicitly
used state law as the basis for its decisions. People v. Waterman,154
affirming and extending Di Biasi, decided that after indictment
the right to counsel is absolute and a defendant must be advised
of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel.
The court referred to article I, section 6 of the New York Con-
stitution and New York case law.'15 People v. Meyer 6 extended
the Waterman rule to the arraignment stage, and People v. Rod-
riguez, 57 reaffirming Meyer, described the state constitutional
ground for the rule:
It is the interrogation, in the absence of counsel, after the criminal
proceeding has been commenced, whether by grand jury indictment
or by a charge placed before a magistrate following an arrest, which
is forbidden. The procedure followed by the law enforcement
officers . . . violated [the defendant's] right to assistance of coun-
sel .... 158
This was the position of the court regarding postarraignment or
postindictment situations.
The court began to develop an even stronger right to counsel
principle in People v. Donovan.15 9 Donovan had been appre-
hended and questioned by the police. After his lawyer's request
to see him had been denied, the police obtained a seemingly invol-
untary confession. The court ruled that any statement made to
authorities by a defendant in police custody after a request for
152. Id. at 550, 166 N.E.2d at 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
153. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
154. 9 N.Y2d 561, 175 N..2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).
155. Id. at 565, 175 N.E.2d at 447, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
156. 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962). Meyer also indicated
that the right to counsel could be waived. Id. at 165, 182 NXE.2d at 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d at
428. See text accompanying notes 184-204 infra.
157. 11 N.Y.2d 279, 183 N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962). In People v. Richardson,
25 A.D.2d 221, 268 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1966), the court held that the right to counsel attaches
once the judicial process has begun. Id. at 223-24, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 422. The arrest and de-
tention of the suspect for purposes of arraignment were considered sufficient conditions for
the attachment of the right.
158. 11 N.Y.2d at 284, 183 N.E.2d at 652, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 355 (citing N.Y. CONsr.
art. I, § 6).
159. 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
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counsel has been ignored, or after counsel's request to see his
client has been denied, is inadmissible.
Donovan is a vivid example of the New York Court of Ap-
peals' use of state constitutional and statutory authority as a basis
for its decisions. 160 It marked a "breakthrough"'-' that, in effect,
was eventually adopted by the Supreme Court in Escobedo.02
And, Donovan retained its vitality after Escobedo and Miranda
by offering additional protection to that given by Miranda. Pro-
fessor Richardson provides the following example:
Consider, for instance, a defendant who, after receiving the
Miranda warnings, and after validly waiving his rights, starts to
answer questions where an attorney retained by his family appears
and demands access to him. Does not the Donovan rule, and not
the Miranda rule, require that the attorney be given access or, at
the least, that the defendant be made aware of the fact that an
attorney is present? 163
People v. Arthur'" was the final major pronouncement by
the New York Court of Appeals in this area during the Warren
Court period. .After reaffirming Donovan's reliance on state con-
stitutional and statutory authority, the court in Arthur proceeded
to extend both the point at which the right to counsel attaches,
and the conditions for waiver of that right:
Once an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question
the defendant in'the absence of counsel unless there is an affirma-
tive waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant's right
to counsel .... There is no requirement that the attorney or the
160. The court's reasoning relied exclusively on New York law. Judge Fuld, writing
for the majority, stated:
[W]e find it unnecessary to consider whether or not the Supreme Court of the
United States would regard [the confession's] use a violation of the defendant's
rights under the Federal Constitution .... [Quite apart from the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this State's constitutional and statutory
provisions pertaining to the privilege against self incrimination and the right to
counsel ... require the exclusion of [this] confession ....
Id. at 151, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 842 (citations omitted).
161. Interview with the Honorable Charles Desmond, former Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals, in Buffalo, N.Y. (June 15, 1978).
162. The United States Supreme Court cited Donovan approvingly in Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. at 486-87. In People v. Sanchez, 15 N.Y.2d 387, 207 N.E.2d 356, 251)
N.Y.S.2d 409 (1965), the court held that the Donovan rule applied to a defendant when
taken into custody whether he is "regarded by police as 'accused,' 'suspect' or 'witness.'" Id.
at 389, 207 N.E.2d at 356, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
163. RIcHARwsoN ON EvIDENcE § 546 (10th ed. 1973).
164. 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968).
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defendant request the police to respect this right of the de-
fendant.165
Arthur's requirements exceeded those of the Warren Court de-
cisions,166 so that by the twilight of the Warren era in the late
sixties, the New York Court of Appeals could properly claim that
"[t]he right to counsel in this State has had a rich development
under the State's Constitution.'
'1 7
The cases decided by the court of appeals between 1969 and
1972 signaled a retreat from the doctrines enunciated in the six-
ties. The court decided that the Donovan-Arthur rule did not
apply to noncustodial interrogation, 6 s or to unsolicited spontane-
ous statements. 69 Then, in People v. Robles,1 0 the Arthur rule
was, for all intents and purposes, emasculated. In an attempt to
distinguish the facts of the case, which seemed squarely governed
by Arthur,'71 the court called the Arthur principle "merely a theo-
retical statement of the rule" and stated that "[t]his dogmatic
claim is not the New York law."' 72 Robles threw the right to
counsel doctrine in New York into disarray.
Six years later, People v. Hobson 74 reaffirmed the Donovan-
Arthur rule in a strongly worded opinion. The court noted that
the state constitutional basis for the rule had "extended consti-
tutional protections of a defendant under the State Constitution
beyond those afforded by the Federal Constitution,"'175 and was
165. Id. at 329, 239 NY.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
166. For an application of Arthur, see People v. Miles, 23 N.Y.2d 527, 245 N.E.2d 688,
297 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1969). Even after Miranda warnings are given, a waiver is impermissible
unless made in the presence of an attorney. Id. at 542, 245 N.2d at 696, 297 N.Y.S.2d
at 924.
167. People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 338, 320 N.E2d 625, 630, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881, 889
(1974).
168. People v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19, 28, 250 N.E.2d 36, 41, 302 N.Y.S.2d 534, 541
(1969).
169. People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139, 144, 250 N.E.2d 329, 331, 303 N.Y.S.2d 41, 45
(1969).
170. 27 N.Y.2d 155, 263 N.E.2d 304, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970).
171. Id. In Arthur, the lawyer appeared and requested that.detectives not question the
defendant any further. The following morning, the detectives did question the defendant,
who made incriminating statements. In Robles, the attorney, who was in the police
precinct with the suspect, left and asked an officer to watch the defendant. The officers
questioned the defendant who then made incriminating statements.
172. 27 N.Y.2d at 158, 263 N.E.2d at 305, 314 N.YS.2d at 795.
173. In his treatise, Richardson had this comment: "It is difficult to determine
the precise impact upon the Donovan-Arthur rule of . . . People v. Robles . . . or the
precise basis for the holding .... " RicARssoN, supra note 163, at § 545.
174. 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976). Robson also reaffirmed
the exceptions to the Arthur rule. See text accompanying notes 168-69 supra.
175. Id. at 483-84, 348 N.E.2d at 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
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justified by the nexus between the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and the right to assistance of counsel of a suspect in cus-
tody. 17  The court believed that Miranda warnings are ineffective
in this context and that an extended right to counsel provides the
only way to ensure that a defendant's rights are more than a
formality.'
77
While the court made it clear that its holding applied only
to persons who had already obtained counsel, its argument would
logically seem to apply to the individual who, having never re-
tained counsel, might be ignorant of the importance of counsel.
But, neither the New York Court of Appeals nor the United
States Supreme Court has taken this position.
Decisions subsequent to Hobson have underscored the New
York court's commitment to protect the right to counsel. In People
v. Ramos,179 the court of appeals held that the burden of inquir-
ing whether the defendant might be represented by counsel, thus
triggering the Donovan-Arthur rule, rests with the prosecution.180
In People v. Howard,'8' a suspect who had counsel was engaged in
conversation by an officer. The appellate division held that al-
though the conversation was not designed to elicit inculpatory
statements, when such conversations do in fact elicit damaging
admissions they must be seen as a form of "latent interrogation"
and be suppressed. 82
176. Id. at 485, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 423. "Notwithstanding that warn-
ings alone might suffice to protect the privilege against self-incrimination, the presence of
counsel is a more effective safeguard against an involuntary waiver of counsel than a mere
written or oral warning in the absence of counsel .... " Id. at 484, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384
N.Y.S.2d at 423.
177. The court recognized that the presence of counsel is important in order to
"protect the individual, often ignorant and uneducated, and always in fear, when faced
with the coercive police power of the State." Id. at 485, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at
423. The right to counsel was "more important than the preinterrogation warnings given
to defendants in custody. These warnings often provide only a feeble opportunity to obtain
a lawyer, because the suspect or accused is required to determine his need, unadvised by
anyone who has his interests at heart." Id. at 485, 848 N.E.2d at 899, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
178. For a review of federal and state cases on this point, see Note, Interrogation and
the Sixth Amendment: The Case for Restriction of the Capacity to Waive the Right to
Counsel, 53 IND. L.J. 313 (1977).
179. 40 N.Y.2d 610, 357 N.E2d 955, 389 N.Y.S2d 299 (1976).
180. Id. at 617-18, 357 N.E.2d at 961, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
181. 62 A.D.2d 179, 404 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1978).
182. For other decisions adhering to the letter and spirit of Hobson, see People v.
Pinzon, 44 N.Y.2d 458, 377 N.E.2d 721, 406 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1978); People v. Singer, 44
N.Y.2d 241, 376 N.E.2d 179, 405 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1978); People v. Buxton, 44 N.Y.2d 33, 374
N.E.2d 384, 403 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1978); People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 371 N.E.2d 819,
401 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977); People v. Howland, 62 A.D.2d 1094, 405 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1978); People
v. Ermo, 61 A.D.2d 177, 401 N.YS.2d 831 (1978); People v. Ellis, 91 Misc. 2d 98, 397
N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
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There are two discrete rules in New York regarding the right
to counsel that have their basis in state statutory and constitu-
tional law. The first is the postarraignment/postindictment rule,
which provides that incriminating statements made after arraign-
ment or indictment in the absence of counsel are inadmissible. 8
3
This rule, developed before Escobedo and Miranda, provides that
if a defendant is not advised of his right to assistance of counsel,
incriminating statements will be inadmissible at trial. While there
are statements in both Waterman and Meyer indicating that the
right to counsel could be waived, the issue was not resolved until
People v. Lopez. s4 In a four to three decision, the court held that
a defendant in a postindictment/prearraignment situation could
waive his right to the assistance of counsel. Judge Breitel, writing
for the dissenters, argued that this decision marked a retreat from
the strong right to counsel that had been developed in New York
"well in advance of the United States Supreme Court."'8 5 He
continued:
Whatever vitality a waiver rule might have under the Miranda
doctrine, other considerations require a contrary rule in the area
of postarraignment and postindictment interrogation. After crim-
inal action is begun, it is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but rather a form of pretrial discovery; it is no
longer a suspect who is being interrogated but the accused; the
interest in affording the police an opportunity to carry on investi-
gatory interrogation for purposes of reaching a decision to charge
and in what degree is diminished. 8 6
Judge Breitel thought that waiver of counsel should be allowed
in preindictment or prearraignment situations, but not in post-
arraignment/postindictment contexts.
The continuing viability of Lopez is questionable. Although
followed in People v. Wooden,8 7 the federal district court in
United States ex rel. Lopez v. Zelker 'l held that Lopez had not
made a knowing and intelligent waiver. Specifically, Lopez had
not known that he had already been indicted, and ignorance of
183. See text accompanying notes 150-58 supra.
184. 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1971).
185. Id. at 26, 268 N.E.2d at 629, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 827 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 28-29, 268 N.E.2d at 631, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 829 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
187. 31 N.Y.2d 753, 290 N.E.2d 436, 338 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
987 (1973).
188. 344 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D.N.Y.), aff"d mem., 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1049 (1972).
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"so stark a legal fact" voided the waiver."' More important, how-
ever, the court of appeals overruled Lopez in People v. Hobson 190
as a matter of state law on other grounds. The New York courts
thus do not accept a waiver of counsel as readily as do the federal
courts.1 91
Hobson left unanswered the question whether a person in
custody can waive his right to assistance of counsel after the filing
of an accusatory instrument, but prior to the entrance of counsel.
Did the New York courts intend to extend the right to post-
arrest/prearraignment situations? In a number of cases, the com-
mencement of criminal proceedings or criminal prosecution has
been set at the filing of an accusatory instrument. 2 Two of these
cases, People v. Cranmer,'09 and People v. Babcock0 4 both read
Hobson as precluding interrogation in the absence of counsel in
both postarraignment and postindictment contexts, and con-
fronted the question whether a defendant can waive his right to
counsel after the filing of a felony complaint, but before actual
arraignment on the charge. In Babcock, police had read the sus-
pect his Miranda rights, which he "intelligently and voluntarily
waived,"'015 and then obtained incriminating statements from him.
189. Id. at 1055.
190. 39 N.Y.2d 479, 490, 348 N.E.2d 894, 902, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 426 (1976). Judge
Gabrielli did not believe that Hobson overruled Lopez, since Hobson had been represented
by counsel while Lopez had decided to forego legal representation. Id. at 491-92, 348
N.E2d at 903, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 427 (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
191. Several federal courts have held postindictment statements made after a waiver
of the right to counsel admissible. United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354, 358-59 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 947 (1971); United States v. Garcia, 377 F.2d 321, -324 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 991 (1967).
192. See People v. Richardson, 25 A.D.2d 221, 268 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1966). The court held
that the right to counsel attached once the "judicial process had been invoked." Id. at 224,
268 N.Y.S.2d at 422. The detention of a suspect for purposes of arraignment is a sufficient
condition for the attachment of the right to counsel. In People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331,
320 N.E.2d 625, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1974), the point at which the right of counsel was held
to attach was the filing of an accusatory instrument. Id. at 339, 320 N.E.2d at 631, 361
N.Y.S.2d at 890. In People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 323 N.E.2d 169, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923
(1974), the court held that the court-ordered removal of a defendant who was a target of
police investigation was sufficiently judicial in nature to warrant the attachment of the
right to counsel.
193. 55 A.D.2d 786, 389 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1976). In Cranmer, the suspect had been in-
dicted, arrested, taken to the police station, and questioned about a robbery. After being
given his Miranda warnings, he waived all of his rights, including his right to counsel.
Accepting the position that Hobson overruled Lopez, the court reversed the conviction on
grounds that in the absence of counsel, the right cannot be waived while the suspect is in
custody after indictment. Id. at 787, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
194. 91 Misc. 2d 921, 399 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Albany County Ct. 1977).
195. Id. at 922, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
The court applied the reasoning of People v. Bodie 196 and People
v. Stockford.0  In Bodie, the defendant had been allowed to waive
his right to counsel, having been properly informed of it, after
the filing of an information and the issuance of an arrest warrant.
In Stockford, the court stated that while
issuance of a warrant is the commencement of a criminal proceed-
ing... this stage of the proceeding has not yet been fully equated
to that which would exist where, after arraignment and the appear-
ance of counsel in a court, the police attempted to question a de-
fendant not in the presence of that counsel .... Nor may an infor-
mation used to obtain an arrest warrant be regarded as the equiv-
alent of the formal triable document .... 198
The court in Babcock stated that Hobson had not overruled Bodie
or Stockford, and declared that "no matter how logically incon-
sistent with the rule set forth in Hobson with respect to post-
indictment, pre-arraignment, situations, it must be assumed that
Bodie and Stockford are still the law with respect to waiver of
counsel in post-information, pre-arraignment, cases." 199 The court
read Hobson as establishing a rule that in cases of indictment,
the point after which the privilege against self-incrimination and
the right to counsel cannot be waived in the absence of counsel
is the filing of the indictment; in cases of accusatory instruments
other than indictments, the starting point is arraignment in
court.2 0
People v. Coleman 201 gave support to the interpretation in
Cranmer and Babcock. Coleman had been incarcerated on an un-
related charge when a judicial order was secured to remove him
from jail for the purpose of conducting a lineup. He was advised
of his right to counsel, a right that he ostensibly waived. Judge
Jasen, writing for the majority, ruled that "the right to counsel
196. 16 N.Y.2d 275, 218 N.E.2d 441, 266 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1965).
197. 24 N.Y.2d 146, 247 N.E.2d 141,299 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1969).
198. Id. at 148, 247 N.E2d at 142, 299 N.Y.S2d at 173 (footnote omitted).
199. 91 Misc. 2d at 925, 899 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
200. While this result might follow from Di Biasi, Waterman, Meyer, and Rodriguez,
see text accompanying notes 151-58 supra, Hobson seemed to affirm the Donovan-Arthur
rule. The police had knowingly questioned Hobson in the absence of his retained counsel.
Moreover, there is some question about the scope of Stockford after the decision in People
v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 320 N.E.2d 625, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1974). In Blake, the court
argued that Stockford no longer applied to preindictment identification proceedings at
least in the right to counsel area. Id. at 339-40, 320 N.E2d at 631-32, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91.
See text accompanying notes 208-34 infra.
201. 43 N.Y.2d 222, 371 N.E.2d 819, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977).
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may be waived notwithstanding the absence of counsel," 202 but
found that the prosecution had failed to establish that the de-
fendant had voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to coun-
sel.203 Coleman indicates that prearraignment or preindictment
waivers are permissible when counsel has not been retained in
connection with the criminal charge at issue. Whether waivers in
postindictment and postarraignment contexts are now permitted
by the New York Court of Appeals is not altogether clear.0
B. Identification Proceedings and the Right to Counsel:
Kirby-More or Less
The Supreme Court, in Kirby v. Illinois,2 5 refused to extend
the Wade principle to a postarrest/preindictment lineup. This
result has not been completely accepted by all states. Michigan,20 0
for example, has rejected Kirby, while other states have attached
the right at earlier points than Kirby might require. 7 Prior to
Kirby and its companion case Ash, New York courts had applied
Wade to both prearraignment and preindictment identification
proceedings.0
New York's initial reaction to Kirby came in People v.
Blake.209 Blake involved two viewings that took place two hours
after arrest, but before arraignment. The court, analyzing the
situation in the context of the "rich development" of the right to
202. Id. at 226, 371 N.E.2d at 821, 401 N.YS.2d at 59.
203. Id. at 227, 371 N.E.2d at 822, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 60-61.
204. People v. Colon, 62 A.D.2d 398, 405 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1978), addressed the question
whether a defendant under indictment for approximately five months could waive his
right and make a statement to police in the absence of counsel. Noting Judge Breltel's
strong dissent in Lopez, the court ruled:
[iMt would seem that the majority in Hobson believed that the commencement
of adversary judicial proceedings through the filing of an indictment is the func-
tional equivalent of the "entry" of a lawyer into the proceedings. That being the
case, it is apparent that there can be no postindictment waiver of the right
to counsel unless counsel is present ....
Id. at 404,405 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
205. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
206. See People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 170-71, 205 N.W.2d 461, 467-68 (1973).
207. For a discussion of the varied responses to Kirby, see Note, State Responses to
Kirby v. U.S. [sic], 1975 WAsH. U.L.Q. 423.
208. See People v. Harrington, 29 N.Y.2d 498, 500, 272 N.E.2d 482, 484, 323 N.Y.S.2d
971, 973 (1971) (Burke, J., dissenting on other grounds); People v. Oakley, 28 N.Y.2d 309,
270 N.E.2d 318, 321 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1971); People v. Logan, 25 N.Y.2d 184, 250 N.E.2d 454,
303 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1969).
209. 35 N.Y.2d 331, 320 N.E.2d 625, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1974).
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counsel under the state constitution,21 ° stated that it was "free to
evaluate independently the necessity of mandating, under the
State Constitution as it interprets it, the presence of counsel at
prearraignment viewings, as a derivative of the right to counsel
without traversing the necessarily vague and elusive byways of the
constitutional right to due process." 211
Before discussing its understanding of Kirby, the court ap-
plied state cases to the lineup question. It began by applying the
Donovan-Arthur rule to identification procedures. The rule pro-
vides that when an accused, at any stage before or after arraign-
ment, is known by officials to have retained counsel, his "right or
access to counsel may not be denied," and that fact "may establish
his right to counsel at the viewing."'2 12 Citing the right to counsel
cases decided in the sixties, the court further concluded that "once
the general right to counsel attaches in a criminal context, even if
defendant has not yet obtained or received a court-assigned lawyer,
the right to have counsel present, where appropriate, at subse-
quent procedures such as a corporeal identification viewing, also
exists. ' 2 13 Turning to an examination of the federal rule as stated
by Kirby, the court accepted the Kirby limitation on Wade, sub-
ject to the state guaranteed rights discussed above. The Supreme
Court in Kirby stated that the right to counsel attaches at the
"initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, informa-
tion, or arraignment." 21 4 The Blake court, following this lan-
guage, explained that in New York proceedings would begin
"with the filing of an 'accusatory instrument' as defined by statute,
which serves as the basis for prompt arraignment or issuance of
a warrant of arrest."2135 The court concluded: "[U]pon the filing
of an accusatory instrument, whether or not a lawyer has been
retained or assigned for general purposes, there may not be, except
210. The court noted that "[a]lthough framed in more restrictive terms, the right
to counsel under the State Constitution has, in some areas, been interpreted more ex-
pansively than under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as interpreted by the Supreme
Court .... " Id. at 335, 320 N.E.2d at 629, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 887 (footnote omitted).
211. Id. at 336, 320 N.E.2d at 629, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
212. Id. at 338-41, 320 N.E.2d at 630-32, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 889-91.
213. Id. at 339, 320 N.E.2d at 631, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
214. 406 U.S. at 689.
215. 35 N.Y.2d at 339, 320 N.E2d at 631, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 890. The New York Criminal
Procedure Law defines an accusatory instrument as an indictment, an information, a
simplified information, a misdemeanor complaint, or a felony complaint. N.Y. CRIa,. PROC.
LAiw § 100.05 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
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in exigent circumstances, a corporeal viewing of the defendant
for identification purposes in the absence of counsel .... ,210
Commentators have concluded that Blake essentially adopted
the Kirby position;217 this is, however, an oversimplification of
Blake. Blake's application of the Donovan-Arthur rule to lineups
gave an accused more protection than the federal rule. Moreover,
it is not certain whether Kirby intended to encompass Blake's
definition of the beginning of the adversary process. 18 In Holland
v. Perini,21 9 for example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals inter-
preted Kirby differently when it decided that a show-up held after
a suspect had been detained and booked, but before formal charges
had been filed, was permissible in the absence of counsel.220 Blake
apparently resolved this issue on state statutory grounds; so, while
Blake did not reject Kirby outright, it also did not accept it with-
out qualification.
The Blake decision creates a basis for different treatment of
those arrested pursuant to a complaint, and those arrested on
probable cause without a warrant. This could encourage police
to delay taking a suspect to a judicial officer, or discourage them
from obtaining warrants. The court in Blake dealt with this po-
tential abuse: "Since such a rule offers opportunity for delay be-
tween arrest and the filing of an accusatory instrument, an undue
delay is prima facie a suspect circumstance suggesting that the
delay may have been for the purpose of depriving the accused of
counsel at a viewing."221 Such delays would be grounds to exclude
the identification.222
216. 35 N.Y.2d at 340, 820 NYE.2d at 632, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
217. See, e.g., Lewin, Criminal Procedure, 27 SYRAcusE L. REv. 69 (1976) ("[t]he
Blake court concluded that the state constitution did not afford any greater protection to
the accused than did the federal constitution," id. at 109 (footnotes omitted)); Note, supra
note 207, at 437.
218. Professor Fellman points out that
[w]hile some courts have taken the position that "adversary judicial proceedings"
begin with the filing of the complaint and the issuance of the warrant, so that the
right to counsel applies to any planned confrontation with witnesses after that, the
more orthodox view has been that the right to counsel so far as identification is
concerned, begins only after the filing of formal charges whether by indictment
or information.
D. FE LmAN, TBm DEFENDANT's RIJGHs TODAY 221 (2d ed. 1976). Under New York State
Criminal Procedure Law, misdemeanor and felony complaints are both accusatory instru-
ments that serve as a basis for commencement of a criminal action. N.Y. CruA. PRaoc. LAw
§ 100.10 (McKinney 1970).
219. 512 F.2d 99 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934 (1975).
220. Id. at 102-03. See id. at 103 n.1.
221. 35 N.Y.2d at 340, 320 N.E.2d at 632, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
222. But cf. Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 173, 320 A.2d 351, 354 (1974).
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Finally, the court noted in summary that "[a]fter arrest but
before the filing of an accusatory instrument the presence of
counsel is not mandated, but is desirable."22 Blake, though
cautiously written, created stronger protection of the right to
counsel in the area of corporeal lineups than Kirby.2 4
C. Right to Counsel: Other Critical Stages
Thus far, this article has concentrated on the right to coun-
sel in the pretrial stages of the criminal justice process. The New
York Court of Appeals also anticipated the Supreme Court's posi-
tion on the right to defend pro se and has extended the right to
have assistance of counsel at parole revocation hearings beyond
the point provided by the Court.
In People v. McIntyre,225 the court faced the issue of the
right of a defendant to represent himself in criminal proceedings.
After noting that "limitations, if any, on the right to defend
pro se remain largely undefined," 226 the court stated that "the
New York State Constitution and criminal procedure statute
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could see no reason for such a difference in treatment.
The court said: "To allow uncounseled lineups between warrantless arrests and prelimi-
nary arraignment would only encourage abuse of the exigent circumstances exception and
undercut our strong policy requiring warrants whenever feasible."
223. 85 N.Y.2d at 340, 320 N.E.2d at 632, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 891 (emphasis added). Law
enforcement agencies in New York have taken this recommendation seriously and, though
not required by Blake, it is standard practice in New York to inform a suspect of his
right to counsel and allow counsel to observe the identification procedures both before and
after the filing of an accusatory instrument, if either counsel or the suspect so desires.
Both the rights required by Blake and those provided as a matter of policy are, however,
subject to various exceptions and exemptions based on exigent circumstances. Such ex-
ceptions were recognized by the federal courts before Kirby. See, e.g., Mock v. Rose, 472
F.2d 619 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971 (1973) (accidental or happenstance
show-ups); United States v. Hamilton, 469 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1972) (arranged show-ups
while suspect is at large); Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280, 1284, cert. denied, 395
U.S. 298 (1969) (prompt on-the-scene show-ups). Blake accepted these exceptions, 35
N.Y.2d at 386-37, 320 N.E2d at 629-30, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 888. These exceptions were applied
in New York in People v. Smith, 38 N.Y.2d 882, 846 N.E.2d 546, 882 N.YS.2d 745 (1976),
and in People v. Styles, 90 Misc. 2d 861, 866, 395 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1011 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
224. In People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 371 N.E.2d 819, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977),
the court extended the point at which a suspect has the right to have counsel at a lineup
to "a court order directing the removal of a defendant serving a sentence on an unrelated
charge," and which required him to visit the scene of the crime. Such an order was suf-
ficiently judicial and "'not unlike arraignment or issuance of an arrest warrant, so that
a right to counsel exists ... after th [sic] order issued .... ' Id. at 225, 371 N.E.2d at 821,
401 N.Y.S.2d at 59 (citations omitted). The court also held, however, that this right could
be "voluntarily and intelligently" waived. Id. at 227, 371 N.X2d at 822, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
225. 36 N.Y.2d 10, 324 N.E.2d 322, 864 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1974).
226. 36 N.Y.2d at 15, 324 N.E.2d at 326, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
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clearly recognize this right.' ' 227 The Supreme Court established
the right to proceed pro se as a federal constitutional right a year
later in Faretta v. California.28 McIntyre represents another ex-
ample of the willingness of the New York State Court of Appeals
to resort to its own constitutional traditions in developing an in-
dependent set of state guaranteed constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court, in a series of decisions beginning with
Mempa v. Rhay,2 9 extended procedural rights for probationers
and parolees. The Court refused, however, to grant an automatic
right to counsel at the hearing to determine whether parole or
probationary status should be revoked in Morrissey v. Brewer2°0
and Gagnon v. Scarpelli.2 31 Prior to Morrissey and Gagnon, the
New York Court of Appeals, in People ex rel. Menechino v.
Warden of Green Haven2 32 had extended the right to counsel
to a final parole revocation hearing, stating that "[t]he demands
of due process, under both the United States Constitution and
the Constitution of New York State, require that a parolee be rep-
resented by a lawyer, and entitled to introduce testimony, if he
so elects."' ' 3
New York's response to Gagnon and Morrissey came in People
ex rel. Donohoe v. Montanye2 34 The court was explicit in its re-
jection of the federal position.
True, the United States Supreme Court has made the right to
preliminary and final revocation hearings depend upon the cir-
cumstances of each case .... Nevertheless, this court is not required
to retreat from its Menechino holding based, in part, on the State
Constitution.
The board regulation [that] bars counsel from final revoca-
don hearings for parolees who have been convicted of a crime while
on parole . . . is inconsistent with the parolee's right to counsel
under the State Constitution. 35
Unlike the areas of intoxication tests, and arrests and searches
related to traffic infractions, here the court of appeals has neither
227. Id., 324 N.E.2d at 326, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 842-43 (citing N.Y. CoNsr. art. I, § 6;
N.Y. Cumt. PROC. LAW §§ 170.10 (6), 180.10 (5) (McKinney 1970)).
228. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
229. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
230. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
231. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
232. 27 N.Y.2d 376,267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
233. Id. at 383, 267 N.E.2d at 242, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 454.
234. 35 N.Y.2d 221, 318 N.E.2d 781, 360 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1974).
235. Id. at 225-27, 318 N.E.2d at 783-84, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 622-23 (citation omitted).
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modified nor retreated from its position in the face of decisions
made by the Burger Court."' In large part, this is the result of
the strong right to counsel tradition in New York-a tradition
that is absent in the other two areas.237
The New York Court of Appeals has also provided greater
protection to individuals than the Supreme Court when there is
a delay between the commission of an offense and prosecution.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Lovasco28 held that a
delay of approximately one and one-half years for investigative
purposes was not a violation of the defendant's due process rights
even though "his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced
by the lapse of time.
239
In People v. Singer,240 the New York Court of Appeals was
confronted with a similar case, except that the delay was for a
period of forty-two months. The court ruled that a defendant is
entitled to a dismissal if the commencement of an action has been
delayed for a lengthy period even though "there may be no
showing of special prejudice. '241 This was the first time the New
York court had held that a delay in proceeding was a ground for
dismissal where no criminal proceeding had been commenced.
The court did not clearly establish whether the crucial factor had
been the length of time, or the lack of adequate justification for
the delay, but it was clear that it interpreted its own due process
236. The Menechino decision in 1971 was a narrow one (4-3), but the Montanye
case in 1974 was 7-0. Major changes in court personnel took place between the two cases.
Only Chief Judge Breitel participated in both cases. In Menechino, Judge Breitel dis-
sented, arguing that while the right to counsel was desirable in the case, it was not
constitutionally mandated. 27 N.Y.2d at 394, 267 N.E.2d at 249, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 464. In
contrast, Judge Breitel wrote the majority opinion of Montanye, and supported the con-
stitutional basis for the right to counsel in these cases.
237. In Davis v. Shephard, 92 Misc. 2d 181, 399 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct. 1977), a lower
court directed town justices to provide assigned counsel to a defendant accused of a viola-
tion even though there was no chance of imprisonment. The court in Davis, though
recognizing that federal cases did not require counsel, see, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972), ruled that § 170.10 (3) (c) of the Criminal Procedure Law "requires the
assignment of counsel when the defendant is charged with a violation . . . in situations
that are not mandatory under the Argersinger ruling." 92 Misc. 2d at 183, 899 N.Y.S.2d at
837. Section 170.10 (3) reads, in part: "the defendant has the right to aid of counsel at the
arraignment and at every subsequent stage of the action." N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 170.10 (3)
(McKinney 1976).
238. 431 U.S. 783 (1977) (8-1 decision; Marshall, J., writing for the Court).
239. Id. at 796.
240. 44 N.Y.2d 241, 376 N.E2d 179, 405 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1978) (4-3 decision).
241. Id. at 254, 376 N.E.2d at 187, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 25-26 (citing People v. Staley, 41
N.Y.2d 781, 364 N.E.2d 1111, 396 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1977), and People v. Winfrey, 20 N.Y.2d
138, 228 N.E.2d 808, 281 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1967)).
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clause to require more demanding standards than the Federal Con-
stitution for the operation of the criminal justice process.
242
The due process clause of the state constitution also pro-
vided the basis for the decision in People v. Isaacson,48 where
conduct of the police, though perhaps not illegal under entrap-
ment standards, was considered "egregious and deprivative" when
tested by due process standards.2 44 In reaching their decision, the
five members of the majority explicitly recognized the court's
right to impose higher standards than those held to be necessary
by the Supreme Court under similar federal constitutional pro-
visions.245 Isaacson represents a significant step in the articula-
tion of state based due process standards as boundaries for per-
missible police conduct.
CONCLUSION
This article has examined the extent to which the New York
courts, and especially the New York Court of Appeals, have re-
lied on the state constitution and common and statutory law to
find an independent basis for procedural rights in the area of
criminal justice. The New York courts, in spite of the modifica-
tions noted in the traffic arrests area,2 40 have consistently recog-
nized the independent value of their own constitutional traditions.
Moreover, this recognition is not a recent phenomenon brought
about by the Burger Court's retrenchment in criminal procedure.
The court of appeals has been able to accomplish this inde-
pendent basis without flatly rejecting various Burger Court inter-
pretations; it has adopted modified versions of Supreme Court
decisions,247 as in Troiano and Blake. In the right to counsel area,
242. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 796-97.
243. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78,406 N.Y.S2d 714 (1978).
244. Id. at 519, 378 N.E.2d at 81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
245. Id. at 519-20, 378 N.E.2d at 82, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
246. See text accompanying notes 91-117 supra.
247. There are really four categories of decisions creating independent state guaran-
tees of rights. The first, and the one on which commentators have tended to concentrate,
is where a state court grants a defendant a right that has been denied by the federal
courts in a similar situation. The New York decisions in this category are Singer, Montanye,
Arthur-Hobson insofar as it applies to waivers before arraignment or indictment,
and Troiano. Troiano is the weakest candidate for this classification, but on the strength
of the dictum in that case and subsequent lower court interpretations, I have concluded
that there is at least a modicum of protection accorded a defendant in a New York court
that would not be available to him in a federal court. A second category is where the
Supreme Court has, in effect, allowed a range of possible interpretations of decisions by
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the court had adopted a state constitutional standard by the six-
ties, and in some cases much earlier. In the case of the Arthur-
Hobson rule, the standard established was even more demanding
than that of the Warren Court. In most of the areas dealt with in
this article, especially the right to counsel, the creation of the
more exacting state standards preceded the recent refusal of vari-
ous state courts to adopt some of the standards established by the
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger. It is, perhaps, for
these two reasons that most commentators either have failed to
note or have misinterpreted the extent to which New York has
been in the forefront in establishing its own standards for the
protection of individual liberty.4 8 Some analysts have criticized
the use of state constitutions as lacking uniformity and have noted
the failure of some state courts to articulate legitimate state inter-
ests to justify rejecting the federal rule.249 This is not the case in
choosing open ended terms such as "initiation of adversarial proceedings," or "custodial
arrest," or "critical stages." Blake would fall into this category. The third category consists
of court decisions granting rights on state grounds in areas the Supreme Court has not yet
decided. Gursey, McIntyre, and the postarraignment/postindictment Arthur-Hobson rule
would be in this category. A final category would consist of rights based on state con-
stitutional guarantees not present in the federal constitution. For example, the New York
Constitution guarantees its citizens the right to benefits of public assistance, N.Y. CONsr.
art. XVII, § 1, and the right to organize and bargain collectively, N.Y. CONSr. art. I, § 17.
I did not find any New York cases in this category. For a similar classification, see Note,
supra note 8, at 788. Only by examining cases in all categories can one gauge the full ex-
tent of independent state law. The so-called "evasion" cases, while spectacular and im-
portant in their own right, constitute only one part of this development.
248. New York cases feature prominently in none of the articles on this topic, and
those that are mentioned, such as Marsh, Troiano, and Blake, are given misleading inter-
pretations. See, e.g., Wilkes' three articles, supra note 7, and Howard, supra note 6.
Since these articles concentrated on the seventies, they often missed the strong right to
counsel tradition created much earlier in New York, while others suggested that this de-
velopment among state courts was a very recent phenomenon. For instance, Supreme Couit
Justice William Brennan wrote: "I suppose it was only natural that when during the
1960's our rights and liberties were in the process of becoming increasingly federalized,
state courts saw no reason to consider what protections, if any, were secured by state con-
stitutions." Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. R.v. 489, 495 (1977). And: "In recent years, however, some state courts have
renewed their interest in this area and have begun to revitalize the guarantees of funda-
mental rights expressed by their state constitutions." Note, supra note 8 at 737-38. Both
statements are misleading at best, and incorrect at worst; however, both stem from the
tendency of recent scholarship to concentrate on the tensions between the Burger Court
and state supreme courts, and as a result, to'neglect the question of the extent to which
state courts had been revitalizing fundamental rights in earlier periods. For examples of
pre-Warren Court research focusing on the expansion of fundamental rights outside the
area of criminal justice, see Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amend-
inent Freedoms, 4 vAND. L. Rxv. 620 (1951), and Paulsen, Persistence of Substantive Due
Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. Rav. 91 (1950).
249. See generally Bice, supra note 8; Howard, supra note 6, at 984-35; Comment,
The Scope of Search Incident to Arrest in California: Rejecting the Federal Rule, 9 U. S.F.
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New York. Decisions such as Marsh and Troiano, Donovan and
Hobson, Stratton and Paddock, Gursey and Craft, Menechino and
Montanye, Blake and McIntyre, exhibit not only a sophisticated
understanding of the federal position, but also contain articulated,
persuasive justifications for these higher standards based on New
York's particular needs and constitutional traditions.
L. REv. 317, 338 (1974); Note, supra note 8, at 737. Howard offers a series of guidelines he
believes state courts ought to consider before deciding whether to strike out on their own
or follow federal standards. For comments on these various problems, see Galie & Galie,
supra note 8, at 291-93.
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